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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to contend that the dominant voluntarism approach to the
accountability of transnational corporations (TNCs) is inadequate and not fit-for-purpose. The authors argue
for the establishment of an international legal mechanism for securing the accountability of TNCs,
particularly in the context of developing countries with notoriously weak governance mechanisms to protect
all relevant stakeholders.
Design/methodology/approach – The study adopts insights from the fields of management and
international law to draw out synergies from particular understandings of corporate governance, corporate
social responsibility and international human rights. The challenges to governance in developing countries
with regard to securing the accountability of TNCs are illustrated with the Nigerian experience of oil-industry
legislation reform.
Findings – The specific context of the experiences of developing countries in Africa on the operations of
TNCs particularly commends the need and expedience to create an international legal regime for ensuring the
accountability of TNCs.
Originality/value – Mainstream research in this area has focused mainly on self and voluntary models of
regulation and accountability that have privileged the legal fiction of the corporate status of TNCs. This paper
departs from thatmodel to argue for an enforceablemodel of TNC’s accountability – based on an international
mechanism.
Keywords Organizational culture, Accountability, Corporate governance,
Transnational companies, Corporate and social responsibility, International criminal court
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The accountability of transnational corporations (TNCs) remains an issue of global concern
(Frynas, 2010; Jamali, 2010b, p. 183). There are grave concerns that those at the helm of
affairs in TNCs are engaged in a race to the bottom through the ruthless pursuit of the profit
maximisation objective (Kapstein, 1999). Others argue that corporate social responsibility
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(CSR) is entirely compatible with long-term profitability (Garriga and Mele=, 2004). The
enactment of notable corporate governance (CG) codes such as the United Kingdom’s
Combined Code 2006 now replaced by the the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012; the
USA’s Sarbanes-OxleyAct 2002; CG standards, principles and guidelines being championed
by supra-national authorities such as the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) and theWorld Bank (van den Berghe, 2001) have done little to ensure the
accountability of TNCs on a global basis. Yet, the dominance of TNCs in the global economic
sphere continues apace. Recent accounts indicate that the current normative underpinnings
of CG and CSR are not directed at addressing accountability deficits and excesses of TNCs.
This is even more so in the context of developing countries (Jamali, 2010a, 2010b) and in
Africa in particular (Omoteso, 2011; Yusuf, 2008).
In the past two decades, there has been increased research interest in the activities of
TNCs and their subsidiaries abroad, especially within the developing world owing to some
high-profile human rights abuse cases against TNCs. Such cases include the following:
• Wiwa et al. v Royal Dutch Shell;
• Kiobel v Royal Dutch Shell (environmental degradation and complicity in unlawful
killings in Ogoniland, Nigeria);
• Bodo v Shell (environmental degradation in Ogoniland, Nigeria);
• Saleh et al. v Titan et al.;
• Al Shimari v CACI (torture of prisoners);
• Presbyterian Church of Sudan et al. v Talisman Energy, Inc. (allegation of aiding and
abetting Sudanese government in torture in South Sudan); and
• the Bhopal cases (leakage of toxic gas from a pesticide plant run by a local subsidiary
of US firm Union Carbide)[1].
Assessing the potentials of the UN’s Protect, Respect and Remedy framework (the UN
Guiding Principles Reporting framework) on corporations and human rights, Fasterling and
Demuijnck (2013) emphasised the moral commitment of corporations as a precursor for the
framework’s “human rights due diligence” requirement. They identified “limits of pragmatic
approaches to coping with business-related human rights abuses” to make a case for a
meaningful “international and extraterritorial human rights law”. Similarly, Seppala (2009)
examined the effectiveness of the three most recent UN initiatives on TNCs and the
human-rights regime which are the following: the “Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations andOther Business Enterprises with Regard to HumanRights”;
the Global Compact; and the work of the UN Special Representative on Business and Human
Rights (all of which are germane to this current work and will be further discussed below).
Seppala (2009) concluded that states remain the primary bearers of human rights obligations
despite these initiatives. In addition, based on the current governance gaps that allow TNCs
to carry out “blameworthy acts” with impunity, de Jonge (2011a) presented a two-part model
that advocates the need to evolve and adapt international law in a way that both holds TNCs
responsible for human rights abuses resulting from their business activities and also
provides remedies to the victims of these abuses. This paper builds on this emerging case for
an enforceable international legal regime for the accountability of TNCs in the light of their
current power and influence.
The contemporary experience of TNCs’ external stakeholders in developing countries,
specifically their host communities and governments, demands an enforceable international
mechanism for achieving TNC’s accountability. As TNCs have, and continue to benefit
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immensely from international law, which protects their property rights and contractual
interests, they also ought to be accountable through international law. This is particularly
important as their clout usually undermines the institutions of governance in developing
countries with notoriously weak governance mechanisms to protect all relevant
stakeholders. This study adopts insights from law and management to draw out synergies
from particular understandings of CG, CSR and international human rights to propose an
enforceable international legal mechanism for securing the accountability of TNCs. CG, CSR
and international human rights share strong bases in the principles of ethics, equity, fairness,
justice and fair play among relevant actors.
The next section sets out the theoretical foundation of the paper; the convergence of CG,
CSR and international law, particularly human rights, to underpin our discussion of the
accountability of TNCs. The third section maps prevailing governance approaches and the
immense economic and political clout of TNCs, as well as the effectiveness of the regulatory
regime of TNCs. Section 4 focuses on the experience of the operations of TNCs justifying a
shift from the current dominating regulatory regime through an empirical focus on Nigeria,
a typical developing country. Section 5 sets out the case for a broadened approach to the
accountability of TNCs in light of their immense power and actual and potential capacity for
impunity. In this regard, we argue that the current situation of impunity for gross violations
of human rights by TNCs justifies conferring jurisdiction on a supranational accountability
mechanism, like the International Criminal Court (ICC), to deter corporate malfeasance. The
paper concludes on the note that continued resistance of TNCs to accountability is not a
positive issue for their continued legitimacy as global actors, draws out the implications of an
enforceable international mechanism for both TNCs and their stakeholders and identifies
possible areas for future research.
CG, CSR, human rights: a framework for accountability of TNCs
Aras and Crowther (2009) have stated that “more enlightened” corporations recognise a
“clear link” between CG and CSR. Others like Clarke and Klettner (2009) similarly emphasise
how CSR mainstreaming is rapidly becoming the norm in corporate strategy design,
deriving from “greater recognition of a direct and inescapable relationship between CG, CSR
and sustainable development” (Clarke and Klettner, 2009, p. 269). These views suggest the
emergence of a new paradigm in CG research, which considers CG, CSR and human rights to
be inseparable as they have their roots in principles such as ethics, fairness, equity,
accountability, responsibility, responsiveness and sustainability. These principles should
enable organisations to give an appropriate consideration to the interests of other
stakeholders while pursuing long-term corporate prosperity.
Garriga and Mele= (2004) and Mele= (2008) have identified four contemporary theories of
CSR. First is the “corporate social performance” theory which is based on a sociological
approach. On taking this approach, a business has responsibilities that extend beyond
wealth creation. It should be concerned with the consequences of its activities and also carry
out ethical and philanthropic activities to benefit society by paying attention to social
expectations. The second is “shareholder value” theory which holds that the only CSR of
business is making profit for its shareholders. This is also referred to as “fiduciary
capitalism”. It is the basis of the neoclassical economic theory which is centred on profit
maximisation for shareholders. The third is “stakeholder” theory. On this view, the
corporation has responsibilities to all those who have a “stake” in its activities. This would
include not just shareholders but individuals and groups like its staff, host community,
clients/consumer, among others. The corporation is obliged to combine its objective of profit
with the legitimate interest of all its stakeholders. The fourth is “corporate citizenship”which
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is sometimes taken to be a substitute term for CSR. However, it refers to the broad notion that
the corporation is a part of society and it is expected to actively engage in acts that promote
human welfare and wellbeing, like any other citizen or member of society.
The United Nations’ recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflect the
state of the contemporary discourse on the integrated and indivisible nature of all human
rights and the overriding aim of sustainable development[2]. The SDGs emphasise the need
to “balance” the three dimensions of sustainable development – the economic, social and
environmental elements in every society and country. Among others, the SDGs seek to
“promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. An
aspect of this goal is to “promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and
ensure equal access to justice for all”[3]. This particular aspect of the SDGs is particularly
relevant here as it aligns closely with the discussion of effective measures to secure the
accountability of any global actor, including TNCs. Equally relevant is the reference to a
“global partnership” for the implementation of the ambitious and wide-ranging
commitments in the SDGs which include an important role for private business, including
TNCs[4].
Dominance, governance and regulation of TNCs – power and (in) glory
It is apparent that TNCs are playing a dominant role not only in the global economic but also
in political arena.Worse still, some governments (or principal officers of the state) have been
found to connive with TNCs in corrupt practices at the expense of the wellbeing of their host
communities. This is especially the case in Africa (Szeftel, 1998, 2000; Kofele-Kale, 2006) and
Asia (Ngo, 2008; Choi, 2007; Javaid, 2010).
TNCs, violations of human rights and abuse of power
TNCs have a record of human rights violations and other forms of abuses of power, including
bribery and environmental degradation, in different parts of the world, which have mostly
gone unchecked especially in developing countries. The Business and Human Rights
Resource Centre website (http://business-humanrights.org/) provides extensive
documentation on the issue.A few instances of rights violations and abuse of power byTNCs
demonstrates the point. There is the 3 December 1984 accident at the pesticide plant of the
mainlyUS-ownedUnion Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India. The host community
suffered extensive violations of the right to life as well as loss of very significant properties
from major operational lapses in the plant. The major issue was the escape of methyl
isocyanate (MIC) and a host of other toxic gases from the company’s operations plant
(Mendes, 2014, pp. 179-183). The gas caused environmental damage, impairment of health
and, according to some accounts, over 20,000 deaths to date (Green Peace USA, 2004;
Mendes, 2014, p. 179). More than three decades on, efforts to secure justice for what has been
described by some as the worst industrial disaster in human history, has continued with
much dissatisfaction on the part of victims. Most of the victims’ efforts to seek redress in the
USA against Union Carbide (the parent company), for negligence under the Alien Torts
Statute (ATS) have been aborted on technical grounds. Though Union Carbide (now taken
over byDowCorporation) has paidUS$ 470m to the Indian government for the victims,most
of the victims remain frustrated with the compensation arrangements which have been
deemed grossly inadequate by victims who are seeking about US$ 3 bn (Green Peace USA,
2004; Mendes, 2014, p. 180).
In June 2004, 256 former Iraqi prisoners filed a case against American corporations, CACI
International and Titan Corporation (now L-3 Services, part of L-3 Communications) in the
US federal court. The two companies were contracted by the government of the USA for the
57
Accountability
of
transnational
corporations
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 C
ov
en
try
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
6:
56
 0
3 
A
pr
il 
20
17
 (P
T)
purpose of interrogating detainees and provision of translation services atmilitary prisons in
Iraq. The former detainees at Abu Ghraib prison brought claims against the two companies
for directing and participating in torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual
assault and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment during their detention. The claimants
alleged they were raped, subjected to repeated beatings, solitary confinement, urinated on,
prevented from performing their prayers and forced to watch their family members being
tortured. They claimed the defendant companies had been negligent in the way they hired
and supervised employees who worked for them in Iraq. A number of other detainees have
followed suit bringing similar claims against both companies but with the same result that
the claims have been dismissed on the basis that the companies are covered by sovereign
immunity, as they were working for and under the supervision of the US military (Business
and Human Rights Resource Centre).
In a bid to stem the tide of TNC’s ruthlessness in their pursuit of profit maximisation and
entrench sustainability of both TNCs and all its stakeholders, governments and
supra-national authorities have been in the forefront of establishing CG codes. Although
most countries have adopted these codes (as applicable), such adoption has not resolved
ongoing shareholder-stakeholder debates (Clarke and Klettner, 2009, p. 269). Consequently,
there is a need for an enforceable international legal mechanism that broadens the scope of
TNCs’ accountability beyond the regulation mode, which has so far dominated its
governance.
Regulation of TNCs – voluntarism: past, present and future?
As a result of the political and economic control of the international system, the dominant but
gradually shifting regulatory regime for the activities of TNCs is centred on CG and CSR.
CSR clearly recognises the need for corporations to be socially responsible citizens cognizant
of the interests of broader stakeholders like host communities and states in the conduct of
their affairs (Beltratti, 2005). However, CSR has its limitations in the face of expanded powers
and influence of TNCs. The real or potential impact on their environment is conceived here to
include the host state, host community and the physical environment. Jenkins (2005, p. 528)
has noted how the dominant presence of corporations as vanguards of CSR has had a major
impact on it; leaving out as much as it includes. Banerjee (2008, p. 59) draws attention to how
practices of CSR suggest that it has developed into “an ideological movement designed to
consolidate the power of large corporations”. This is likely connectedwith themanagerialist,
as opposed to emancipatory, origins of CSR (Banerjee, 2008, p. 74). Others like Frynas (2010)
contend that CSR is not only inadequate for addressing governance challenges but it may
actually contribute to governance failures. Yet, business organisations, especially TNCs,
have consistently used CSR to prevent the introduction of “mandatory international
regulation” of their activities. The basic premise of that position is that CSR reflects the
commitment of business to voluntary responsible behaviour and any attempt to introduce a
mandatory regulatory regime will jeopardise “this goodwill” (Pendleton, 2004).
Increasingly, the hitherto well-rehearsed position that international law applies only to
states and not individuals, and certainly not the corporation has lost normative steam. The
United Nations, since the 1990s, has signalled this in incremental steps even though these
have remained less than satisfactory. One such step was the introduction of the United
Nations Global Compact in 2000 (UN Compact). This now contains ten principles in the areas
of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption derived from four major
international instruments on these issues[5]. However, notwithstanding the visibility of the
UN Compact, it is not even a regulatory instrument but rather, “a voluntary initiative” which
places reliance on “public accountability, transparency and disclosure” as a “complement” to
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regulation (UN Global Compact Office, 2011, p. 1). It is easy to see that the UN Compact
directed at “corporate sustainability” though endorsed by over 8,500 signatories in over 135
countries, holds little promise for accountability of TNCs (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004).
Notwithstanding the handicaps of the UN Compact, it does denote recognition within the
international system for addressing the activities of TNCs for global wellbeing.
Another relevant step was the draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (Norms)[6]
proposed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, an
expert subsidiary body of the then Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in 2003. It was
highly contentious at the time because it attempted to impose on TNCs the same duties that
the states had for human rights, under the international law. It suffices to mention just a part
of Article 1, the “general obligation” provision as it sets the tone for the Norms as a whole.
After reaffirming state responsibility for human rights under the international law, it states
that within their “spheres of activity and influence” TNCs (and other enterprises) have an:
[…] obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human
rights recognised in international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of
indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups.
This arguably progressive approach failed to gain the support of businesses and
governments though it was fully backed by some human rights groups (Backer, 2005;
Weissbrodt, 2005/2006). Its implementation was eventually dropped by the erstwhile CHR.
Despite the rejection, the CHR requested the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special
Representative to move beyond the stalemate and clarify “the roles and responsibilities of
states, companies and other social actors in the business and human rights sphere” (Ruggie,
2011, p. 1), hence the appointment of Professor John Gerard Ruggie with this mandate.
Ruggie presented his final report to the Human Rights Council (HRC) in March 2011, which
unanimously adopted the Guiding Principles (Ruggie, 2011) annexed to the report on 16 June
2011. The Guiding Principles represents the current official international normative regime
addressing the expectations and obligations of stakeholders regarding the activities of
TNCs. The focus on human rights is premised on the view that it is arguably the acutest
arena in which the impact of TNCs’ power is felt.
On the face of it, the Guiding Principles appear to represent a quantum leap forward in
seeking to address the impact of business on human rights and especially the responsibility
of TNCs. Adopting what has come to be recognised as the standard of the United Nations
system in the area of human rights – “Respect, Protect and Fulfil Framework” –,it restates
the duty of states to ensure respect for human rights by business enterprises within their
jurisdiction andwhere applicable, even extra-territorially. This is particularly relevant in the
context of recognition that accountability through a human rights compliant regime in
contrast to other forms (principally CG and CSR) appears so far, to hold the best promise for
accountability of TNCs as a key constituent of global governance organisations. While CSR
initiatives have been undertaken selectively, a human rights approach requires business
enterprises to respect every type of human rights rather than a selection of issues they feel
comfortable with. Thus, “a human rights framework provides a universally recognised,
people-centred approach to companies’ social and environmental impacts” (Business and
Human Rights Resource Centre, 2012).
However, the Guiding Principles remain a “guide” – principles which are of a non-binding
character. As Amerson (2012) points out, while Ruggie’s work “is transformational, it is still
incomplete” as victims of rights violations by TNCs who lack the means to obtain redress at
the domestic level are not able to do so through the international law. The most that can be
said for theGuidingPrinciples is Ruggie’s (2011, p. 5) candid submission that their normative
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contribution is not the creation of new obligations for business under international law but
the elaboration of existing standards. In short, Ruggie’s work constitutes a “restatement” of
the (recently, slightly modified) classic position regarding non-state actors in international
law; that in practice, they are mostly able to get away with violations of human rights (even
gross ones) on the pretext that only states are the subject of international law. Ruggie also
anticipates further developments in terms of the need for taking on the challenge of
mitigating the impact of TNCs (and business generally) on human rights.
The Guiding Principles remain a perpetuation of what has been a recognised fact on
forms of global accountability arrangements, namely, that they are commonly liable to
serving the purposes of strong “constituents” like “major governments and large
corporations” (Scholte, 2011). It is to be argued that even at the point of developing the
Guiding Principles, there were sound policy reasons for moving beyond the voluntarism
approach underlying them. Many others have called for dropping voluntarism or at least
supplementing it with an enforceable legal regime (Muchlinski, 2001; Simons, 2004). Reliance
on the moral force for the actualisation of the Guiding Principles as far it relates to TNCs is
problematic as the experiences of developing countries demonstrate.
TNCs and policy capture in developing countries – the case of Nigeria’s oil
policy reforms
A poignant example of the nature and impact of the policy capture of TNCs – their ability to
shape and control governance and state action – in developing countries is their resistance to
current efforts to bring about reform in the operations of the oil and gas industry in the
country. The country’s oil and gas legislation had not been revised and the regulatory bodies
have become inefficient and corrupt due to lack of comprehensive reform since the beginning
of oil exploration in commercial quantities in 1958. Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB)
emanated from the report of the Oil and Gas Reform Implementation Committee (OGIC)
established by the Federal Government in 2000with amandate to carry out a comprehensive
reform of the oil industry.
The PIB, conceived as an “omnibus legislation” for establishing “clear rules, procedures
and institutions for the administration of the petroleum industry in Nigeria” (Lukman, 2009,
p. 4) is intended to align the country’s oil and gas industry with current global best practices
(p. 16). The principal objects of the reforms are to institute transparency, address
environmental concerns, check corruption, improve revenue collection, optimise local
content, streamline and strengthen regulatory institutions in the sector. The reform process
is directed at moving the country’s oil sector from being “one of the most opaque” in Africa,
to “one of the most open and transparent in the world” (Lukman, 2009, p. 4). But the reform
effort has been stoutly resisted by transnational oil corporations (TOCs) operating in the
country.
Expressing their discomfiture with the proposed legislation, which seeks to reduce the
dominance of transnational oil corporations and presumably their profits, the oil exploration
giants in the country, notably Shell and Chevron have threatened the move could lead to the
country losing over US$ 50 bn investments in the sector (Rowell, 2010; Alike, 2012). The PIB
has had a chequered history, as it was first introduced in the country’s federal legislature in
2008 and remains a bill through the administration of three presidents from the same party.
It has been revised at least five times (and is under further review) due to pressures from a
number of quarters; including political actors ostensibly championing regional interests in
the country (Thurber et al., 2011)[7] but principally, “vested interests of key players in the oil
industry”, notably the TOCs (Salaudeen, 2013). The fate of the PIB remains uncertain. This
experience is not unique to Nigeria but common in many developing countries. Such level of
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influence and immense power of TNCs needs to be made accountable and in an effective
manner too.
While TNC lobbies and influence exist everywhere, it is more difficult for them to trump
public weal and democratic principles in the home states of TNCs, especially in developed
Western countries. Many of TNCs’ home states, usually OECD countries that have been in
the vanguard of voluntarism, have over time developed strong institutional and legal
regulatory arrangements based on deliberative democratic participation. These serve as
important, even if not completely effective checks onTNC’s power and influence over society
as a whole and governance in particular. With the deficient institutional capacity of
developing countries, the lopsided power equation between TNCs and resource-rich
developing countries suggest the need for a balancing and accountability mechanism. A
mandatory, internationalised legal regime is the sine qua non to maintain a balance in the
power relations between TNCs and stakeholders and secure the accountability of the former.
TNCs in developing countries: case for an enforceable international
mechanism for accountability
The Norms earlier mentioned, challenged the:
[…] dominant conceptual matrix – a private law model based on national regulation focused on
state-sanctioned economic amalgamations of power that ultimately serve one class of stakeholders,
the shareholders, above all others (Backer, 2005, p. 192).
As earlier sections of this paper have sought to show, the interest, the power and influence of
TNCs on governance and what is arguably their insensitiveness to the plights of other
stakeholders remain an important part of the governance crucible in the developing
countries in particular. The excesses of TNCs seem to continue unabated in spite of the
continuous review of and updates to various CG codes across the globe. This section
attempts to chart a course for curtailing the excesses of TNCs based essentially on the
premise of international human-rights law. This is premised on the position that:
[…] it may well be the case that further legislative and regulatory intervention will be required to
ensure all corporations fully respond to the growing public demand that they recognize their wider
social and environmental responsibilities (Clarke and Klettner, 2009, p. 270).
It is relevant at this point to briefly explain the justification for recourse to human rights as
a mechanism for securing accountability of TNCs. The international human rights law has
become a critical feature of the attempts to restrain state power in view of the gross violations
of human rights committed during World War II[8]. It is clear that the absence of
international restraints leaves the powers of states unchecked and provides a licence for
impunity including the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the
reality that TNCs have continued to seriously challenge the traditional “economic and
political dominance of governments” (ICHRP, 2002, p. 9). As a result, TNCs can (and do)
directly and indirectly threaten and violate human rights of citizens across the globe through
their operations. It is apposite that TNCs be equally reigned in by the same mechanisms
designed to constrain the ability of states to legitimately impugn on human rights of their
citizens. The International Council on Human Rights and Policy (ICHRP, 2002, p. 10) states
the case for international human rights appropriately in this regard:
Just as human rights was initially developed as a response to the power of states, now there is a need
to respond to the growing power of private enterprise, which affects the lives of millions of people
around the world.
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For the exercise of power to be effective and legitimate, it must be accountable and this is the
case also with accountability of TNCs, especially in their historical position as a frontier of
global governance (Scholte, 2011, pp. 10-11). Global governance organisations are those
bodies, institutions or agencies whose activities have far-reaching impact on the enjoyment
of “global public goods” (Scholte, 2011). As a result, accountability of global governance
organisations is an imperative rather than “an optional extra” (Scholte, 2011, p. 15).
Scholte (2011, p. 15) has defined “accountability” from a critical global governance
context to meet the need – “to constrain power and make it responsive to the people that it
affects, including in particular people who tend otherwise to be marginalised and silenced”.
On this account, accountability goes well beyond the “good-governance” notion with its
emphasis on cost-effectiveness, financial probity and effective performance (Scholte, 2011,
pp. 15-16). This understanding of and approach to accountability is adopted in this
discussion as it is apt for the context of TNCs’ operations and their impact in developing
countries. This is because such countriesmeant to regulate the activities of TNCs are usually
ruled by governments, which are weak and often times corrupt. In such countries, host
communities are notably socially disenfranchised and lacking a voice; suffering but
voiceless communities. Further, we agree with Scholte that notwithstanding the various
notions of the definition of accountability, there is consensus on the position that its main
concern is a process whereby “actors”; like TNCs, are required to provide “answers” to those
their actions affect. Of course, the point of contention in this context (as with others) remains
defining who constitute that constituency of impact.
Traditional notions of business organisations suggest a very restricted purview of
accountability. Over four decades ago, Milton Friedman famously argued that corporations
could not be said to have “responsibilities”, suggesting that at best, corporations have a
much-restricted duty of accountability. Friedmanmaintained that the social responsibility of
business is tomake profitwith its stakeholders identified as the promoters and shareholders.
Except as “amatter of pure rhetoric” even corporate executives cannot be said to have “social
responsibility” as that would amount to an expectation that corporate executives are
required to act in a manner contrary to the interest of their employers (Friedman, 1970).
Friedman’s position assumes that CG is adequate normatively and operatively for the
management of the affairs of corporations. Further, the notion of “social responsibility” is
achieved at the expense of the owners or promoters of corporations. It is safe to assume that
many now disagree with Friedman’s position, which dominated the operational and
managerial philosophy of TNCs. As the Hammer and Lloyd have noted, the circumstance of
the global economic crisis has revealed “gaping holes” in the exclusive CSR, self-regulation
approach to CG. This is because:
[…] ensuring accountability is not about developing high visibility promoting compensatory
activities, however valuable they are in themselves, but about preventing systemic failures and
external harm in the first place (Hammer and Lloyd, 2011, p. 11).
A number of salient factors justify a more robust approach to the CG regime for managing
the accountability of TNCs in developing countries in particular. The globalised reach of
TNCs, their trans-national status, their financial clout in an era of neo-liberal trade, their
influence on state policy across a spectrum of state functions and responsibilities all
commend a concerted effort at a regime of accountability that transcends the state. An
internationalised legal regime is required if the well-being of the vulnerable in societies and
states in which they operate truly matter. In addition to existing measures dominated by
voluntarism, it is logical to advocate a coercive international legal mechanism for the
regulation of TNCs. In the domestic sphere, mainly in developing countries, existing
mechanisms for regulating the activities of TNCs are usually subject to considerable
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influence. Such mechanisms are often outdated, weak or generally open to, and are actually
habitually manipulated by TNCs directly or through proxies in developing countries.
The current state of affairs justifies a supranational accountability mechanism like the
ICC (Clapham, 2008). However, in advancing the case for prosecuting TNCs for gross
violations of human rights by the ICC, establishing the basis of corporate liability is a major
challenge. This is due to the fact that criminal law traditionally developed around natural as
distinct from a “legal” person. The consensus on the nature of the development of criminal
law theory in this regard is that by the time “corporations became significant social and
economic actors, criminal law had already absorbed ideas of individualist rationality and
moral autonomy” (Wells, 2010, p. 194). There is also the neoliberal attitude (arguably an
ideological bias) which extols the benefits of corporate power while (re-)constructing the
harm caused by corporations as marginal or even inevitable (Tombs and Whyte, 2015).
On this account:
[…] companies could be regulated, but theywere not “real” criminals. Theymight avoid tax but they
were not fraudsters, for example. They might cause death to their workers or to the public, but this
was a price to pay for legitimate commerce (2010, p. 197).
Combining the neoliberal attitude with the limitation that the corporation cannot be
imprisoned, critics of corporate criminal liability challenge the value of recourse to criminal
law for extracting accountability of corporations (Khana, 1996).
At a conceptual level, the challenge of instituting corporate criminal liability is embodied
in the reality that while corporations act only through natural persons, their operations and
activities are conducted within complex hierarchies, structures and processes. Critiques of
corporate liability maintain that the corporate structure makes it difficult to establish intent
and by extension, individual culpability, a basic tenet of criminal law. This reality makes it
somewhat difficult to forge a link between the corpus of criminal law and the corporation
(Donaldson and Watters, 2008, p. 1; Colvin, 1996; Bucy, 2007). However, as Justice Posner
observed in Flomo v Firestone, resistance to corporate criminal liability is eroding. There is
substantial evidence that criminal liability of the corporation is gaining reasonable ground
(Donaldson and Watters, 2008).
Simply because criminal prosecution of corporations has not taken hold as a universal
norm, continuing resistance to it is not justified. Corporate bodies are liable for criminal
offences in various domestic jurisdictions. Legislative developments in some national
jurisdictions and the international system, including the ICC, arguably present favourable
conditions for articulating criminal liability ofTNCs for gross violations of human rights and
other grave abuses. The view that it is inappropriate to seek accountability of TNCs through
“penal concepts of criminality” (de Jonge, 2011b, p. 162) does not appear to have taken into
consideration the current state of the law regarding corporate liability in some domestic
jurisdictions, especially in developed countries like Australia, the USA and the United
Kingdom, which could usefully inform the design of the ICC jurisdiction over TNCs.
More than any other country, Australia appears to be one jurisdiction that boldly bears
out the view that resistance to corporate liability is not as strong as it used to be. In
Australian criminal law, the challenge of grounding corporate criminal liability has been
substantively addressed by the development of the organisational liability model. This is
evident, particularly in federal (Commonwealth) legislation. The Australian Criminal Code
(ACC) makes express provisions for corporate criminal liability. General principles of
corporate criminal responsibility for offences contained in the ACC states in part that its
provisions “applies to bodies corporate in the same way as it applies to individuals”. The
application is with specificmodifications set out in theACC and “such othermodifications as
are made necessary by the fact that criminal liability is being imposed on bodies corporate
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rather than individuals”[9]. The ACC also provides that “a body corporate may be found
guilty of any offence, including one punishable by imprisonment”. Section 4B of the Crimes
Act 1914 allows for a fine to be imposed for offences that only specify imprisonment as a
penalty.
The organisational model of liability is based in part on “corporate culture” or what Bucy
(1991) has also referred to as “corporate ethos”. Section 12 (3) of the ACC provides that where
there is a need to prove intention, knowledge or recklessness as a fault element in relation to
a physical element of an offence, this fault element must be attributed to a body corporate
that expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.
The means of establishing such authorisation by, or permission of, the corporation includes
proving that a “corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed,
encouraged, tolerated or led to noncompliance with the relevant provision”[10]; or that the
corporation “failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with
the relevant provision”[11].
The organisational model of corporate liability holds very important promise for
overcoming the peculiar structure of the corporation with regard to establishing liability for
acts or omissions that cause harm to victims. The model addresses the interaction and
relation between the corporation and its employees, as well as agents, more directly than the
traditional approach which relies essentially on “lifting the corporate veil”. As the foregoing
provisions indicate, the model holds corporations directly liable in circumstances where
features of the organisation of the corporation, including its “corporate culture”, directed,
encouraged, tolerated or led to the commission of the offence. Thismodel, “arguably themost
sophisticated model of corporate criminal liability in the world” (Clough and Mulhern, 2002,
p. 198) should be adopted by a supra-national or international court like the ICC in dealing
with cases involving TNCs, as proposed here.
The choice of the ICC is apt because it was established to check impunity perpetrated
under the guise of conflict (Lee, 1999, pp. 1-2). This is despite the existence within every
national jurisdiction now State Party (and non-state) to the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC
(Rome Statute, 1998) of a criminal justice system that could try the offences designated as
international crimes under a plethora of international instruments. As Lee (1999, p. 1) pointed
out, the motivation for the creation of the ICC came directly from the inability or
unwillingness of states to apply the relevant national and international laws to check
impunity. Interestingly, the recognition of national competence in that regard informs the
principle of complementaritywhich is emphasised in the preamble of the Rome Statute of the
ICC and repeated inArticle 1 of the Rome Statute (Schiff, 2008, p. 77). As against the principle
of jurisdictional primacy, under the principle of complementarity, where the crimes
proscribed by the Rome Statute have been committed, states have the responsibility to
prosecute for the respective crimes and only a failure, inability or unwillingness to do so
triggers the ICC’s jurisdiction (Cassese, 2008, pp. 336-342). This is with a view to prevent
impunity in the face of state failure or unwillingness to act as required by relevant national
and international laws (Holmes, 1999, pp. 41-42).
Some have argued against conferring criminal jurisdiction over TNCs on the ICC even
while conceding the need to subject TNCs to the regime of international law in light of their
immense powers as global economic actors. While recognising the benefits of conferring
jurisdiction on the ICC over TNCs, de Jonge (2011b, p. 161) argues that there are “more
compelling” reasons against such a move. She points to the challenges that attended the
setting-up of the ICC in the first place, as well as the ongoing “controversy” regarding its
operations. In light of this, she argues, it would be virtually impossible to secure the
expansion of the ICC to cover the accountability of TNCs. Another objection, which de Jonge
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considers even more fundamental, is that based on the principles of state responsibility,
criminal liability cannot attach to a corporate person any more than it can to a state. She
argues further that while TNCs should be liable for their “internationally wrongful actions”,
it is not appropriate to invoke criminal concepts for the purpose (de Jonge, 2011b, p. 162).
De Jonge’s concern about the realpolitik that has trailed the establishment and operations
of the ICC are well founded. Some would even argue that the ICC has a legitimacy crisis with
reference in particular to its virtual exclusive focus onAfrica to the neglect of other situations
of impunity in other parts of theworld. ICC’s lack of focus onwestern actors in conflicts in the
Middle East is a notable example. This at least arguably raises important concerns on its
investigative and prosecutorial independence. However, the problems of the ICC in this
regard are neither peculiar to it as a judicial or international institution nor are they
insurmountable. Moreover, international and supranational law institutions, including even
the United Nations, continue to be focal points for accountability in an era of increasing
incidence of economic and political globalisation. This is also the case with the legal and
judicial institutions created by them. The active contestations that have attended
international relations and international law have made the international system fertile for
progressive development and adoption of norms andmeasures which had been traditionally
considered impossible some decades past. This includes the establishment of the ICC in the
first place.
A further issue regarding the use of the ICC is the argument that if the African experience
on gross violations of human rights byTNCs grounds the argument for criminal prosecution
of corporations, an African judicial forum should be appropriate for redress. Thus, the
African Court for Human Rights, rather than the ICC, should be the choice institution for
accountability of TNCs. On this view, conferring corporate criminal jurisdiction on the
African Court of Human Rights (ACHR) for violations of human rights committed by TNCs
on the continent would fortify the prosecutions of TNCs there against criticism of
imperialism. On the face of it, this is a good argument in principle, particularly because the
ACHR is an institution of the African Union with existing jurisdiction over rights violations.
So, its jurisdiction on this account only needs to be extended to include gross violations of
human rights committed by TNCs. However, the main challenge of the absence of political
will to confront rights violations on the part of African leaders, which has characterised its
establishment and work, makes it an unattractive option. Further, even with such a
jurisdiction, the court’s decidedly restricted, state-centric rules of legal standing severely
limit the opportunities for relevant individuals and communities’ access to it. Moreover, the
global reach of the operations, impact and influence of TNCs commend adoption of an
institution like the ICC with substantial global outlook – even if not current reach – as the
forum of choice.
While corporations cannot be jailed like individuals in criminal proceedings, they can be
convicted and fined (and have been heavily fined in the USA for instance) and punished in
other ways. There is, for example, the United Kingdom’s Corporate Manslaughter and
Corporate Homicide Act 2007, which aims at ensuring accountability for grave management
failings across a corporate organisation leading to fatality. Under this law, an organisation is
guilty of manslaughter if the way in which its activities are managed or organised, causes a
person’s death and such death amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by
the organisation to the deceased. On conviction, a corporate body can be subject to an
unlimited fine, ordered to take remedial action and be required to publicise its conviction.
The order on publicising its own conviction is an important penal tool, which recognises the
possible impact of adverse publicity on its economic activities.
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At this point, it is relevant to advert to two other objections raised by critics of corporate
criminal liability regarding the sentence of fines following the conviction of corporations.
The first is that fines, and especially heavy ones, impact negatively only on the shareholders
and is thus perhaps then unjustified. This objection is effectively met by the fact that
punitive damages are imposed in civil proceedings to similar effect. The second objection is
linked to the response to the first question: as the corporation cannot be jailed and there are
punitive damages in civil proceedings, why prosecute? This too can be met by the response
that fines arising from criminal proceedings against the corporation constitute a further
deterrent to corporate criminality and impunity. As Justice Posner of the USA Court of
Appeal pointed out in the recent case of Flomo v Firestone[12], while civil liability may allow
for punitive damages, such damages do not serve as the perfect substitute for fines arising
from criminal proceedings. A fine could serve as a source of further sanction where the
corporation has engaged in fraud for instance yet, it is virtually impossible for victims to
prove causation on the facts. Fines in such circumstances “increase the expected cost of
fraud” when the fraud is committed by the corporation[13]. Significantly too, the “hands and
feet” (directors and senior management) of corporations can be convicted along with the
corporation and actually jailed alongside the corporation.
It is arguable that circumstances of impunity and objectives of combating it that led to the
establishment of the international criminal justice regime exist with regard to accountability
of TNCs, particularly in developing countries. During the negotiations for the ICC Statute,
there was indeed, a bid to have the criminal responsibility of legal entities, whichwould have
included the liability of corporations alongside that of natural persons, but this did not scale
through ostensibly due to different national legal conceptions of the liability of legal persons.
Some jurisdictions did not recognise criminal liability of corporations and this will have
implications for the concept of complementarity upon which the Rome Statue was built
(Saland, 1999, p. 199). Such inclusion would have strengthened the hands of and provided a
viable opportunity for victims of TNC crimes to secure accountability (Chesterman, 2011,
p. 323).
Furthermore, at the international level, the concept of personal criminal liability, joint
criminal enterprise and command responsibility for international crimes have been very
useful for combating impunity. These concepts in the Rome Statute which, as rightly noted
by de Jonge (2011b, pp. 158-161), can be applied to officers of TNCs, have considerably
enhanced the ability of international law to bring relevant state and non-state actors
(including former heads of state and warlords) to justice for international crimes. What is
required is the political will, which as noted above, may be tough in securing in view of
powerful vested interests. Still, it is reasonable to contend that with persistent advocacy,
especially with the diligence of relevant voices like that of conscientious academics and
activists, TNCs can be brought under ICC jurisdiction in a not too distant future.
Conclusion
As CG codes continue to enjoy wider acceptance across the world as the ideal mechanism to
govern the modern corporation, stakeholders remain wary of the blatant dominance and
excesses of TNCs in both the political and economic spheres.We have suggested the need for
advertence to an enforceable international mechanism for regulating and achieving broad
accountability of TNCs. The empirical experiences of TNCs’ external stakeholders in
developing countries reinforce the need for recourse to a system of enforceable international
mechanism to ensure accountability of TNCs.
There are a good number of reasons for holding TNCs to account for their power through
a human-rights approach. One is the justification that in the reality of TNCs’ benefiting
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immensely from international law; it protects their property rights and contractual interests
(ICHRP, 2002, p. 12). They should also be accountable through the international law in light
of their clout, which typically overwhelms the institutions of governance in developing
countries (which are often tooweak to be effective).While TNCs stand out as amajor frontier
of power that has so far largely defied effective accountability, ultimately, it is plausible to
posit that it will go the way of other formerly inscrutable fronts for securing immunity from
accountability. The recent developments in the international criminal law with the
cumulative institution of universal jurisdiction, the creation of crimes against humanity and
war crimes, the diminution of Head of States’ immunity and superior command, all point to
progressively diminishing frontiers of impunity.
To be sure, conferring jurisdiction on the ICC over TNCs may attract criticism of another
imperialist design even conceivably from governments complicit in the abuse and violations
of the human rights of their own citizens, particularly in developing countries. This is
already an issue with the ICC as mentioned above. However, the experience of combating
impunity shows that those engaged in impunity challenge even national arrangements and
institutions designed or established to regulate and check various abuses. Thus, real or
imagined fears of such charges of imperial design should not deter the creation of such a
jurisdiction in an international institution. An important strategy for making such
jurisdiction viable is to ensure the high integrity of the operators of the relevant institution,
in this case, the ICC.
The argument canvassed in the foregoing for the adoption of a human rights-based
approach as part of the design for extracting accountability of TNCs is in recognition of the
under-realised promise of the human rights corpus for accountability for power. The
adoption of a human rights-based approach is a progression of the calls for liberating the
contemporary human rights movement from simply advancing liberal capitalist economic
interests. It is consistent with the position advanced by scholars like Mutua (2001) for the
need to utilise human rights for addressing asymmetrical power relations specifically in this
case, between West-owned and controlled powerful TNCs and individuals and groups (host
communities) in developing countries. In this way, the human rights corpus, which is called
in service of global capitalism notably through the promotion and legalisation of property
rights, is deployed for regulating and combating the excesses of TNCs, a major agent of
globalisation.
An enforceable international mechanism like the ICC will reduce the pressure on
governments of developing countries to find ways to “right the wrongs” of TNCs, thus
enabling pressure and lobby groups to channel their resources to other productive
endeavours. Added to these, such mandatory international mechanism will, in the long run,
enhance the reputation of TNCs through closer observance of wider stakeholders’ interests.
This would, in the medium term or the long run increase their profitability. As a follow up to
this paper, future empirical research that engages with the potential impacts of a mandatory
international mechanism on various TNCs’ stakeholders will be invaluable. Future studies
could also consider assessing the likely effect of such mechanisms on TNCs that have their
roots in socialist economies and theocratic states.
Notes
1. The details of these and many other cases are available on the Website of Human Rights and
Business Resource Centre: http://business-humanrights.org/ and the Centre for Constitutional
Rights: http://ccrjustice.org/
2. See “Transforming ourworld: The 2030Agenda for sustainable development”A/69/L.85; agreed by
Heads of States and High Representatives at the New York Headquarters of the UN at a meeting
67
Accountability
of
transnational
corporations
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 C
ov
en
try
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 0
6:
56
 0
3 
A
pr
il 
20
17
 (P
T)
held on 27-30 September 2015, available at: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbolA/69/
L.85&LangE (accessed 2 October 2015).
3. Paragraph 16.3.
4. Paragraph 39-46.
5. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organization’s Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.
6. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
7. It is also commonly believed that the oil giants have been sponsoring opposition to the PIB in
Parliament. See for instance “End the dithering on petroleum industry bill”, The Sun, 22 January.
8. This presumably informs part of the preamble to the Universal Declaration of HumanRightswhich
states: “Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which
have outraged the conscience of mankind.”
9. Criminal Code Act 1995 (as amended), Part 2, Section 12.1.
10. Section 12.3(2)(c).
11. Section 12.3(2)(d).
12. Boimah Flomo et al v Firestone Natural Rubber Co. LLC No. 10-375.
13. Flomo v Firestone, 9-10.
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